Jurisdiction Over Lands Ownedy by the United States Within the State of Washington: Part I, The Subject in General by Rupp, John N.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 14 Number 1 
1-1-1939 
Jurisdiction Over Lands Ownedy by the United States Within the 
State of Washington: Part I, The Subject in General 
John N. Rupp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John N. Rupp, Jurisdiction Over Lands Ownedy by the United States Within the State of Washington: Part 
I, The Subject in General, 14 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 1 (1939). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
and
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME XIV. JANUARY, 1939 NUMBER 1
JURISDICTION OVER LANDS OWNED BY THE UNITED
STATES WITHIN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOHN N. RUPP*
PART I
THE SUBJECT IN GENERAL
Among the unique characteristics of our federal system of gov-
ernment is the concept of the dual sovereignty of the national and
state governments over land, things, and persons located within the
boundaries of the states. In addition to its position and rights as
ultimate sovereign over all territory within its borders, the United
States is also a corporate body politic and as such can make con-
tracts, and can hold property, both real and personal.1 Under this
power to own property in its own right the United States has be-
come a great landed proprietor, owning many tracts of land within
the exterior boundaries of the states, and it is this fact which gives
rise to the problems of jurisdiction and control with which this
paper is concerned.
The normal situation under the pattern of dual sovereignty by
the federal and state governments is that which exists when a
private person owns land within a state. In such a case the power
of the federal government is comparatively small and is strictly
limited by the Constitution. The furthest departure from this
"norm" is found in cases where the federal government owns land
within a state and exercises exclusive jurisdiction over it; here the
state is completely ousted of jurisdiction, -and there is a small
"federal island" within the boundaries of the state. Between these
two points there are three intermediate variations; hence the intra-
state lands owned by the federal government may be divided into
four classes on the basis of the amount of control that that gov-
*Of the Seattle Bar.
'U. S. v. BurrIll, 78 Atl. 568 (Me., 1910). It may 'be that the power of
the United States to hold property is derived solely by implication from
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution, which gives Congress "power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other property belonging to the U. S." And see Ashwander v.
Tenn. Val. Auth., 297 U. S. 288, 338 (1935), holding that the method of
disposing of government property must be one adopted in the public
interest.
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ernment exercises over them.2 I. Land owned by the United States
as a proprietor, but not devoted to any public purpose. II. Land
owned by the United States as a proprietor and used for a purpose
appropriate to the functions of the federal government. III. Land
owned by the federal government, and over which it exercises ex-
clusive jurisdiction except for certain powers which the state re-
served to itself when it ceded jurisdiction. IV. Land owned by the
United States, and over which it exercises exclusive jurisdiction.
CLASS I. LAND OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES, BUT NOT DE-
VOTED TO ANY PUBLIC PURPOSE.
In its capacity as a body politic the United States has much the
same power to acquire property as has any corporation. It can
receive it as a gift from a private person ;3 or from a state ;4 it can
take it by foreclosure when it was held as security for a debt ;5 it
can purchase it at a tax sale for delinquent federal taxes;6 or it
can take it by devise from a private person,7 so long as the state law
does not prohibit such devises.8 In none of these cases is it neces-
sary that the federal government intend to devote the land to a
public purpose. Such acquisitions of land by the United States
are, however, rare; and the greatest part of this first class is com-
posed of public lands of the United States to which the federal
government reserved title, but not jurisdiction, in the Acts of Con-
gress admitting states to the Union. Upon the admission of the
states these lands became integral parts of the several states, with
the federal government occupying the position of a mere pro-
prietor.9
Over all the areas in this class the jurisdiction of the state is com-
plete, except that it "does not extend to any matter not consistent
with the power of the United States to protect its lands, to control
2For this basic classification I am indebted to Mr. H. R. Fields, the
author of an excellent comment on Jurisdiction Over Nationally Owned
Areas Within the States. 24 CALIF. L. REV. 573 (1936).
'Fay v. U. S., 204 Fed. 559 (C. C. A. 1st, 1913).4Crook Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604 (C. C.
E. D. Va., 1893); State v. Oliver, 35 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tenn., 1931); Silas
Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 58 U. S. Sup. Ct. 233 (1937); REm. REV.
STAT. §§ 7411, 7412.
'Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98 (U. S., 1851).
'Van B'rocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1885); U. S. v. Penn, 48
Fed. 669 (C. C. E. D. Va., 1880).
'Dickson v. U. S., 125 Mass. 311 (1878).
8U. S. v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 (1877).
'Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 527 (1884); Canfield
v. U. S. 167 U. S. 518 (1896); U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910);
Light v. U. S., 220 U. S 523 (1910); Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78 (1911) ;
McKelvey v. U. S., 260 U. S. 353 (1922); U. S. v. Bateman, 34 Fed. 86
(C. C. D. Calif., 1888); St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Satterfield, 27
F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Page v. Pierce County, 25 Wash. 6, 64
Pac. 801 (1901).
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their use, and to prescribe in what manner others may acquire
rights in them."1 0 Thus the state cannot tax such lands," and its
law cannot affect title to them. -12 The federal.government may pro-
vide that such lands be kept unfenced,' 3 and that there shall be
no interference with free passage over them.14 Once Congress has
outlined its broad policy, it may confer power on the proper fed-
eral officers to regulate details. 5 However, ''the police power of
the state extends over the federal public domain, at least where
there is no legislation by Congress on the subject, "'16 and Congress
cannot use its power as proprietor to destroy the "essential uses of
private property" located on the public lands." The state alone
has jurisdiction over ordinary crimes committed on such lands, 8
and the state law of persons and things is the law therein. The
federal government, of- course, has power to punish violations of
such regulations as it may make pursuant to its power to protect
and control its lands, and such state laws as conflict with these
regulations must yield to them.'9
CLAss II. LAND OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES AND DEVOTED TO
A PUBLIC PURPosE.
When any of the lands in the first class are devoted by the
United States to a purpose appropriate to the functions of the fed-
eral government they fall into the second class.20 In addition, lands
which are purchased for a public purpose"- and without any con-
sent or cession of jurisdiction by the state, and lands which are
condemned by the United States through an exercise of its right
of eminent domain, 2 to which condemnation the .state in no way
"Utah Power & Light Co. v. U. S., 243 U. S. 389, 404 (1916).
"Van Brocklin v. Tenn., 117 U. S. 151 (1885) (Of. Forbes v. Gracey,
94 U. S. 762 (1876)); Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S.
496 (1889); Page v. Pierce County, 25 Wash. 6, 64 Pac. 801 (1901); WASH.
CoNsT., Art. XXVI.
"WNilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 516 (U. S., 1839); Jourdan v. Barrett,
4 How. 169, 185 (U. S., 1846).
=Canfield v. U. S., 167 U. S. 518 (1896).
"McKelvey v. U. S., 260 U. S. 353 (1922).
EU. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910); U. S. v. Hunt, 19 F. (2d) 634
(D. C. D. Ariz., 1927).
160maechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 346 (1917).
"Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78, 86 (1911).
1"U. S. v. Stahl, Fed. Case No. 16,373 (C. C. D. Kan.. 1868).
"U. S. v. Hunt, 19 F. (2d) 634 (D. C. Ariz., 1927). Federal agents
who killed off surplus deer in a national forest pursuant to an order of
the Department of Agriculture held not punishable for violation of the
state game laws.
"Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 527 (1884).
"41 U. S. C. A. § 14: "No land shall be purchased on account of the
United States except under a law authorizing such purchase."
"Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367 (1875); U. S. v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883);
U. S. v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1895). The United States
cannot condemn land except for a public purpose. U. S. v. Certain Lands
in Louisville, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) (Cert. granted, 296
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consents, form a part of this class. The lands included in these
first two classes have in common the characteristic that the control
exercised by the federal government over them does not depend
upon the consent of the states within which they are located; these
rights of ownership and control either are attributes of the United
States as a sovereign or are granted to it by Article IV, Section 3,
Clause 2 of the Constitution.
2 3
The jurisdiction exercised by the federal government over the
areas in this class is similar to that which it has with respect to
lands in Class I, except that, in addition to the restriction that
the state cannot interfere with the proprietary rights of the na-
tional government, there is the further limitation that the state can
do no act which will embarrass the federal government in the
exercise of the powers and functions incident to the public purpose
to which the lands are devoted.24 The land remains part of the
state, and the state has, except for the two restrictions just noted,
complete jurisdiction over the land, and the things and persons
upon it. The state may not tax the land,25 nor any federal instru-
mentality upon it, 25 and there is authority for the proposition that
it may not require federal employees living on such lands to do
acts which would hinder their effectiveness as servants of the
United States.; Otherwise the civil laws and the civil jurisdiction
of the state control persons and things on the land, and the criminal
U. S. 567 (1935). Dismissed at request of petitioner, 297 U. S. 726 (1936).)
(A low cost housing and slum clearance project is not a public purpose
sufficient to justify condemnation, by the federal government, of private
land within a state.) The federal courts have jurisdiction of such con-
demnation proceedings. Kohl v. U. S., supra.
"See Note 1, supra.
21Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 (1884); Arlington
Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); U. S. v. Tierney, Fed. Case No.
16,517 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1864).
2Cases cited in note 11, supra.
'But see Rainier Nat. Park Co. v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 159, 45 P. (2d).
617 (1935) (Park Co. held liable to pay a state occupation tax although
it contended that it was a federal instrumentality); Silas Mason Co. v.
State Tax Comm., 188 Wash. 98, 61 P. (2d) 1269 (1936); and James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937) (Held, a contractor en-
gaged In building locks and dams for the federal government on land
-belonging to the United States is not such a federal agent or instrumen-
tality as to escape a state tax laid on gross income. Four of the justices
dissented.) Cf., Panhandle Oil Co. v. Miss., 277 U. S. 218 (1927) (A sales
tax levied by the state on a sale made to the United States for the use
of the Coast Guard and a Veterans' Hospital held to be an improper bur-
den on the federal government even though the seller paid the tax.)
See generally on this point, Stokes, State Taxation and the New Federal
Instrumentalities, 22 IOWA L. REv. 39 (1936).
2'Pundt v. Pendleton, 167 Fed. 997 (D. C. N. D. Ga., 1909) (An army
teamster living on a fort in Georgia cannot be compelled by Georgia to
work on state roads.) Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920). (A
post office employee driving a post office truck on a post road in per-
formance of his duty cannot be penalized by the state for failure to
procure a state license to drive.)
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jurisdiction of the state is exclusive except where it conflicts with
some federal regulation necessary to the proper administration of
the area.28 Accordingly the current state law of contracts, torts,
ete., is in force within the area; a state sales tax on private sales
therein should be valid; and special state statutes, such as a work-
men's compensation act, should apply, at least to private persons
residing upon the tract.
Just what is a "public purpose" sufficient to put federally
owned lands into this second class is a point apparently not con-
sidered in the cases. The concept of a public purpose in the law is
exceedingly elastic, and one who seeks a "general rule" seeks in
vain. However, there is no reason to suppose that the courts will be
hampered by the absence of a precise definition in deciding whether
or not the federal government has devoted its lands to a purpose
sufficiently "public" to warrant placing the lands in this second
class, 29 as the restrictions on the state are slight, and the power
given the federal government is reasonable and proper. Hence it is
probable that lands set aside for national recreational parks, na-
tional military parks, national cemeteries, and national monuments
fall within this category.
C13Ass III. LAND OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OVER
WHICH IT EXERCISES EXCLUsrvE JURI DICTION EXCEPT POR CER-
TAIN POWERS RESERvED BY THE STATE.
It is impossible to consider the problems of jurisdiction and con-
trol presented when lands fall into this third category without first
briefly surveying the entire field covered by the third and fourth
classes.
The United States Constitution provides that, "The Congress
shall have the power to exercise exclusive legislation 0 in all cases
whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square)
as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Con-
gress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and
to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent
of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the
2U. S. v. Tierney, Fed. Case No. 16,517 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1864); U. S.
v. Stahl, Fed. Case No. 16,373' (C. C. D. Kan., 1868); U. S. v. Bateman,
34 Fed. 86 (C. C. D. Calif., 1888); People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225(N. Y., 1819); People v. Mouse, 259 Pac. 762 (Cal., 1927). See Bell, The
Legal Phases of Cession of Rocky Mountain National Park, 1 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 35 (1928).
"The case of U. S. v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville (supra
note 22) is authority only on the point that a slum-clearance, low-cost
housing, and unemployment relief project is not a public purpose suffi-
cient to justify the condemnation of private land.
""'Exclusive legislation" of necessity means "exclusive jurisdiction",
Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 531 (1884); U. S. v. Cor-
nell, Fed. Case No. 14,867 (C. C. D. R. I., 1819).
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erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings.' '3 1 When the state gives unqualified consent to the
purchase of land by the federal government for any of the pur-
poses prescribed in the Constitution the jurisdiction of the United
States becomes, ipso facto, exclusive, without any other act by the
state.2 Until recently there was reason to believe that any attempt
by a state to reserve any jurisdiction over such lands (except the
right to serve process within the area for acts done beyond the
boundaries thereof) would be void ;33 but in James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co.,3" the United States Supreme Court held that, when
consenting to a purchase by the federal government, a state can
reserve such "concurrent jurisdiction as is not inconsistent with
the jurisdiction ceded to the United States by virtue of such
acquisition."
The United States may also acquire exclusive jurisdiction over
land owned by it within a state by an express cession of jurisdic-
tion by the state,35 provided that the United States devotes such
land to a purpose within its powers to exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion. And when a state thus cedes jurisdiction it can likewise re-
serve to itself any jurisdictional powers, and can attach to its
cession any conditions, not inconsistent with the federal govern-
ment's power to control the land with respect to the purposed use. 6
Thus the United States gets exclusive jurisdiction except for cer-
tain powers which the state sees fit to reserve to itself. The lands
3
'Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
12Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 532 (1884); Surplus
Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647 (1929); Murray v. Gerrick Co., 291
U. S. 315 (1933); U. S. v. Cornell, Fed. Case No. 14,867 (C. C. D. R. I.,
1819); In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545 (C. C. D. Wis., 1895); U. S. v. Tucker,
122 Fed. 518 (D. C. W. D., Ky., 1903); People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225
(N. Y., 1819); Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655
(1919).
3'U. S. v. Cornell, Fed. Case No. 14,867 (C. C. D. R. 1., 1819); Common-
wealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811); Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114
U. S. 525, 533 (1884).
4302 U. S. 134 (1937). Held, under the statute quoted (Micnm's
W. VA. CODE 1937, § § 3, 4), West Virginia can tax the gross income of a
contractor engaged in constructing locks and dams on land owned by the
United States within the boundaries of West Virginia, because the state
had reserved that power.
"Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 (1884); Benson v.
U. S., 146 U. S. 325 (1892); Battle v. U. S., 209 U. S. 36 (1907); Standard
Oil Co. v. California, 291 U. S. 242 (1933); U. S. v. Watkins, 22 F. (2d)
437 (D. C. N. D. Cal., 1927); Williams v. Arlington Hotel Co., 22 F. (2d)
669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 62 P.
(2d) 7 (Ore., 1936); Atkinson v. State Tax Comm., 62 P. (2d) 13 (Ore.,
1936); Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919).
3Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); U. S. v. Unzeuta,
281 U. S. 138 (1929); Standard Oil Co. v. Calif., 291 U. S. 242 (1933);
Crook Horner & Co. v. Old Pt. Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604 (C. C. E. D.
Va., 1893); In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C. C. D. Neb., 1896); St. Louis-San
Francisco R. Co. v. Satterfield, 27 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). See
Bell, Jurisdiction Over Ceded Territories, 1 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 272 (1928).
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over which federal and state control is thus divided comprise the
third class of areas owned by the United States.
The idea that a state could cede any part of its jurisdiction to
the United States except by consent to purchase as provided in the
Constitution37 is a comparatively recent development and was first
expressed by Air. Justice Field in Fort Leavenworth B. Co. v.
Lowe.38 There are references in earlier cases to "cession of juris-
diction," 3 9 and many of the state acts consenting to the purchase
of land by the United States "ceded" jurisdiction, but all these
were references to the cession which occurred when the state con-
sented to purchase, and the view which prevailed before the Fort
Leavenworth R. Co. case was that the state had no power to cede
its jurisdiction over land within its borders except by consenting
to the purchase by the United States of land to be used for one
of the purposes set out in the Constitution.40
The principle of express cession is now firmly established in the
law,4' but it opens two questions of considerable interest. First:
Are there any limits to the power of a state to cede its jurisdiction
to the United States? Suppose, for example, that a state desires
to cede to the United States complete jurisdiction over all the
lands within its borders owned by the federal government, but not
devoted to any public purpose. No case has come to hand precisely
on this point, but the validity of such a cession is doubtful, because
the state has no power, under our system of government, to cede
jurisdiction over such lands.42 If the state and the United States
were independent sovereigns, I take it that the cession would be
valid. But the two are not independent of one another, and their
dealings must be conducted in a manner fitted to carry out the
purposes of the Constitution. In the Fort Leavenworth R. Co.
case the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the state could cede
its jurisdiction over land to be used for a public purpose, because
such cession would be for the benefit of the state.43 Now, if the
benefit that will accrue to the state from the national government's
"Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
'l14 U. S. 525, 540, 541 (1884).
"U. S. v. Penn., 48 Fed. 669, 670 (C. C. E. D. Va., 1880); Sinks v.
Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 316 (1869).
'°Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 538 (1884); People v.
Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225 (N. Y., 1819); U. S. v. Stahl, Fed. Case No. 16,373
(C. C. D. Kan., 1868); CooLEY, CoxsrrIoNAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed., 1927)
p. 258 (editions of this work published before 1884, however, do not
discuss the point); STony, Txm CoNsTrr UION (5th ed., 1891) § 1227.
"Cases cited in note 35, supra.
12This problem must be approached from the angle of the state's power
to cede jurisdiction, because the federal government has power to exer-
cise the jurisdiction if it can secure it. It Is now settled that the Con-
stitution does not limit the sovereignty nor the external functions of the
United States. i. S. v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).d114 U. S. 525, 541 (1884).
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use of the land for a public purpose is the fact which gives the
state power to cede away its jurisdiction, then the state can have
no power to cede jurisdiction over land which is not to be used
for a public purpose, as it is clear that the use of federal land for a
non-public purpose will not benefit the state.
The character of the "public purpose" sufficient to support an
express cession of jurisdiction has not yet been clearly pointed out.
The remarks of Mr. Justice Field, just discussed above, seem to
indicate that the Supreme Court was then of opinion that the
purpose must be one of those enumerated in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 17 of the Constitution. But in the case of In re Kelly"
a lower federal court expressly stated that a state could cede
jurisdiction over land to be used for a public purpose, although
that purpose was not one of those set out in that clause. Reason-
ably, the only limit should be that the purpose must be appropriate
to the exercise of the functions given to the federal government by
the Constitution. Upon this premise, the cessions by various states
of exclusive jurisdiction over national parks can be sustained.
The second question raised by the principle of express cession of
jurisdiction is: What powers can the state reserve, and what con-
ditions can it attach to the cession, when it cedes jurisdiction to the
United States? The general principle is that it can reserve any
jurisdiction not inconsistent with the power of the federal govern-
ment to control the area for the purpose for which jurisdiction
was ceded,45 and what reservations are consistent with this power
will depend to some extent, of course, upon the particular use to
be made of the land. The right to serve civil and criminal process
within the federal area for acts committed outside it is almost
always reserved to the state.4 6 The right to tax private property
located on the land over which jurisdiction is ceded may be reserved
by the state in the act of cession.47 The state may retain the right
to open roads across a ceded area, so long as the roads do not in-
terfere with the federal government's use of the land.48 There
"71 Fed. 545, 550 (C. C. D. Wis., 1895). See also Yosemite Park &
Curry Co. v. Collins, 20 F. Supp. 1009 (D. C. N. D. Cal., 1937).
,"Cases cited In note 36, supra. This principle has now been extended
to cover cessions by consent to purchase. James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937).
"Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 533 (1884); Conces-
sions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919); Ryan v. State,
188 Wash. 115, 61 P. (2d) 1276 (1936). The reservation of this right Is
regarded as compatible even with the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States. U. S. v. Cornell, Fed. Case No. 14,867 (C. C. D. R. I., 1819).
"Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 542 (1884); Benson
v. U. S., 146 U. S. 325 (1892); Williams v. Arlington Hotel Co., 22 F.(2d) 669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Satter-
field, 27 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
11U. S. v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138 (1929). This, however, does not give
the state jurisdiction over the roads opened. People v. Hillman, 246 N. Y.
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have been attempts by the states to reserve to residents of ceded
lands the right to vote in state elections,4 9 and, of course, a state
may make such a reservation if it wishes to do so, inasmuch as a
state may enfranchise even an alien. However, most state consti-
tutions provide that voters must be residents of the state,50 and one
residing within such an area is not a resident of the state.5
When Virginia deeded to the United States the land for Fortress
Monroe it also ceded its jurisdiction over the land, with the proviso
that if the United States appropriated the lands to any purpose
other than that of a fort the lands should revert to Virginia. This
reverter proviso was held to be a valid reservation by the state.2
So far as the jurisdictional point is concerned, however, such a con-
dition is not particularly important because the rule seems to be
that the jurisdiction ceded to the United States will lapse if the
federal government ceases to use the land for the purpose for
which jurisdiction was ceded.5 3 It is interesting also to observe that
the United States may re-cede to the state all the jurisdiction given
it by the state, and this regardless of whether or not it has ceased
to use the property for the public purpose originally contem-
plated.' 4 The consent of the state is not necessary to the validity
of this recession of jurisdiction, the theory being that the juris-
diction of the United States is merely a suspension of that of the
state.5
The cession of jurisdiction by a state is regarded as in the nature
of a contract.5 0 Hence the United States must accept the cession.
467, 159 N. E. 400 (1927); Baker v. State, 47 T. C. R. 482, 83 S. W. 1122
(1904).
"ISinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); Foley v. Shriver, 81 Va. 568
(1886); State v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334, 97 S. W. 299 (1906); Note 20
HARV. L. REV. 497 (1906).
rWASH. CoxsT., Amendment 2 and Amendment 5.
u'Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592,
133 AtI. 729 (1926). (An army officer and his wife residing on a military
reservation are not residents of the State of Maryland, and hence the state
courts have no jurisdiction to divorce them.) Accord, Dicks v. Dicks,
177 Ga. 379, 170 S. E. 245 (1933). The Lowe case is noted in 36 YALE L. J.
146; 40 HARV. L. REV. 130; 11 MrNN. L. REV. 74.
"Crook Horner & Co. v. Old Pt. Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604 (C. C.
D. D. Va., 1893). See also Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399 (1895), noted
In 6 HAnv. L. REv. 264.
"1Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 542 (1884); Arlington
Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St.
431 (1871); LaDuke v. Melin, 45 N. D. 349, 177 N. W. 673 (1920).
"'State ex rel. Cashman v. Board of Commissioners, 153 Ind. 302, 54 N. E.
809 (1899); Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St. 431 (1871). In 1935 Congress
passed acts expressly re-ceding to the states any jurisdiction theretofore
taken by the United States over lands acquired for low cost housing, slum
clearance, resettlement, or rural rehabilitation projects. 49 STAT. 2025; 49
STAT. 2035 (1935).
"Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St. 431 (1871).
"In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C. C. D. Neb., 1896).
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However, the acquisition of control is regarded as beneficial; so the
acceptance will be presumed.5" As a result of this contractual
theory the rule is settled that the state alone cannot alter the
division of power once the cession has been made and while the
United States continues to use the land for the purpose for which
jurisdiction was ceded.58
When the purpose for which the land is to be used by the federal
government is not one of the purposes enumerated in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution, it has been argued that the
state did not cede exclusive jurisdiction unless Congress demanded
it or unless the state expressly stated that the jurisdiction was to
be "exclusive"; that inasmuch as "rights of sovereignty are
never to be taken by implication" '59 the United States gets only
such jurisdiction as is necessary to carry out its purpose, when the
state cedes only "jurisdiction".60 However, the great majority of
such acts expressly cede "exclusive jurisdiction" and then proceed
to make reservations.
It frequently happens that the federal government does not use
all of a ceded area for a public purpose. Thus it may allow an hotel
to be built on land primarily used as a fort. The rule presently
is that such areas are not to be divided, and that, where the area
is used primarily for a public purpose, the use of a small part of
it for a non-public purpose is immaterial; the jurisdiction of the
United States is the same over the entire area.6 1
When the state cedes to the United States exclusive jurisdiction
over a tract of land, that land ceases to be a part of the state, and
this is so even though the state reserved the right to serve process
or the right to tax or the right to open roads.62 Unless the state
reserved the right to tax, it has no power to tax private property
51t. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 625 (1884); Benson v.
U. S., 146 U. S. 325 (1892); Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011 (D. C. W.
D. Wash., 1916); U. S. v. Watkins, 22 F. (2d) 437 (D. C. N. D. Cal.,
1927); Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 58 Sup. Ct. 233 (1937) (pre-
sumption rebutted).
5In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C. C. D. Neb., 1896).
"People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 232 (N. Y., 1819).
OIn re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545 (C. C. D. Wis., 1895); People v. Mouse, 259
Pac. 762 (Cal., 1927). For subsequent opinion, see 203 Cal. 728, 265 Pac.
944 (1928).
"Benson v. U. S., 146 U. S. 325 (1892); Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant,
278 U. S. 439 (1929); U. S. v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138 (1929); Williams
v. Arlington Hotel Co., 22 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). Cf. Crook
Horner & Co. v. Old Pt. Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604 (C. C. E. D. Va.,
1893); and Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399 (1895).
2Standard Oil Co. v. Cal., 291 U. S. 242 (1933); In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31(C. C. D. Neb., 1896); Pundt v. Pendleton 167 Fed. 997 (D. C. N. D. Ga.,
1909); U. S. v. Cordy, 58 F. (2d) 1013 (D. C. D. Md., 1932); Sinks v.
Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 156
Ore. 505, 62 P. (2d) 13 (1936); Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46,
186 Pac. 655 (1919).
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located within the boundaries of the ceded territory. 3 Inasmuch
as the area is not a part of the state, the state has no more right,
without an express reservation of that right, to tax income earned
upon it by a citizen of another state than it would have to tax in-
come earned by such person in a foreign country.6 4 Similarly it
should have no power to tax a sale made within the territory, at
least where the taxing statute applies only to sales made "within"
the state.69 The state has no criminal jurisdiction over ceded terri-
tory, because a criminal act done thereon is not done "against the
peace and dignity" of the state ;66 nor does the state have any civil
jurisdiction over persons,67 land, and things68 located upon the area
ceded.
We have seen that when the state cedes to the United States ex-
clusive jurisdiction over land to be used for a federal purpose, even
though the state may make certain reservations compatible with the
power of the federal government to control the area, the land ceases
to be a part of the state,69 and the state law no longer prevails
therein. But there must be some law in force upon such land.
Manifestly it is within the power of Congress to legislate upon this
subject, and in the field of criminal law Congress has handled the
situation adequately. Section 272 of the Federal Criminal Code'0
makes that code applicable to offenses committed on lands under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and it seems that
this includes lands within this third class. 7 To round out the
pattern of the criminal law Congress has from time to time enacted
the so-called "assimilative crimes acts.' '72 These acts, in effect,
"Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919).
"Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 505, 62 P. (2d) 7
(1936); Atkinson v. State Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 461, 62 P. (2d) 13 (1936).
Standard Oil Co. v. Cal., 291 U. S. 242 (1933); U. S. v. Cordy, 58 F.
(2d) 1013 (D. C. D. Md., 1932); REm. REv. STAT., § 8370-16.
"Kelly v. U. S., 27 Fed. 616 (C. C. D. Me., 1885); In re Ladd, 74 Fed.
31 (C. C. D. Neb., 1896). See 3 CENTRAL L. J. 743.
OlLowe v. Lowe, 150 'id. 592, 133 Atl. 729 (1926) (See note 51, supra.)
Cf., Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P. (2d) 464 (1936). A Kansas statute
expressly opens the Kansas divorce courts to residents of federal military
reservations within that state.
"See In re Grant's Estate, 144 N. Y. S. 567 (1913) where the New York
courts probated the estate of one who died domiciled on a federal military
reservation. But, held that New York could not tax the transfer at death.
cCases cited in note 62 supra.
7018 U. S. C. A. § 451.
"Benson v. U. S., 146 U. S. 325 (1892); U. S. v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S.
138 (1929); Kelly v. U. S., 27 Fed. 616 (C. C. D. Me., 1885); In re Ladd,
74 Fed. 31 (C. C. D. Neb., 1896); U. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518 (D. C.
W. D. Ky., 1903); Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011 (D. C. W. D. Wash.,
1916). Compare, Watts v. U. S., I Wash. Terr. 288 (1870) in which land
within Washington Territory, but under the joint occupancy of the armies
of the United States and Great Britain pending settlement of a boundary
dispute was held to be not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
"The first was enacted in 1825 and appears in 4 STAT. 115. The latest
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make the criminal law of the state within which the federal area is
located extend to offenses committed on such area, which offenses
are not expressly covered by the Federal Criminal Code. The
jurisdiction of the state is in no wise extended; it is as though Con-
gress had enacted a whole group of minor penal statutes to apply
to areas within its executive jurisdiction.13 Accordingly, state
penal statutes enacted after the last assimilative crimes act do not
apply to the federal lands.7
4
In the field of ordinary civil law, however, Congress has done
very little for the lands within its exclusive jurisdiction; and, as
the state law, as such, does not apply,7 5 these areas have become a
sort of no-man's land in the law.7" In the case of Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. R. R. Co. v. McGlinn77 Mr. Justice Field laid down a
principle which has had a great effect on the status of the private
law applicable to intrastate areas within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States. The defendant's railroad ran through Fort
Leavenworth, a military reservation, jurisdiction over which the
state of Kansas had ceded to the United States, reserving only the
right to serve process and to tax certain private property on the
tract. Before Kansas had passed this act of cession there was in
force in the area a Kansas statute making railroad companies liable
for injuries to livestock which strayed onto an unfenced right-of-
way. After the cession, plaintiff's cow, not realizing the furore she
was about to cause, wandered upon defendant's track on the mili-
tary reservation and was killed by a train. The Supreme Court
held that the Kansas statute was still in force on the ceded tract,
because it was a "municipal law" and was not affected by a trans-
fer of jurisdiction. This holding was an application of the general
principle of public law that the law which regulates the intercourse
and general conduct of individuals remains in force until abro-
gated or altered by the new sovereign.7 8 The rule thus established
has been carefully followed in later cases and is now well settled.7"
was enacted in 1935. 49 STAT. 394, 18 U. S. C. A., § 468.
"1Burns v. U. S., 274 U. S. 328 (1926); U. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518(D. C. W. D. Ky., 1903). For an interesting case involving a widely
published criminal libel see U. S. v. Press Pub. Co., 219 U. S. 1 (1910).
71U. S. v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (U. S., 1832); Franklin v. U. S., 216 U. S.
559 (1909); Western Union Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274 (1908).
"5Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542 (1884);
Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); Williams v. Arlington
Hotel Co., 22 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
7See Pillsbury, Law Applicable to National Parks and Other Federal
Reservations Within a State, 22 CALlF. L. REV. 152 (1933). See also 37
YALE L. J. 796 (1927).
"1114 U. S. 542 (1884).
"American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (U. S., 1928).
"Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); Murray v. Gerrick
Co., 291 U. S. 315 (1933); In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C. C. D. Neb., 1896);
Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011 (D. C. W. D. Wash., 1916); Williams
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It is clearly a reasonable rule, for without it the ordinary conduct
of individuals residing on intrastate land under the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States would be governed solely by the com-
mon law, but it has the unfortunate result of leaving these areas
under an antiquated legal system while the people of the surround-
ing lands make progress in the law. No doubt, the sensible thing
is for Congress to enact "civil assimilation acts" similar to those
which seem to work so well in the field of the criminal law.80
Although the state has no jurisdiction over the territory under
the exclusive aegis of the federal government, one must remember
that the state's jurisdiction over the inhabitants of such territory
is not entirely inhibited. When a person comes upon the soil of a
state, he is normally within its jurisdiction. This fact is not par-
ticularly important in the law of crimes, because the fixed rule of
public law is that one sovereign will not enforce the criminal law
of another;81 nor is it important in the case of the so-called "local
actions", where the jurisdiction over the action depends upon the
wrong's having been committed upon land within the territory
over which the jurisdiction of the court exteids8 2 But when a
defendant commits a wrong of a transitory character-as a breach
of contract or a negligent invasion of plaintiff's right to be secure
in his person-then the plaintiff may sue the defendant wherever
he can find him."' Thus if the defendant negligently injures the
plaintiff while on a federal area, the plaintiff can sue the defendant
in a state court, if he can serve him upon state lands. The state
court will have jurisdiction of both parties and can proceed to
judgment-the law applied will, of course, be that in force over
the federal area. If the state reserved to itself in the act of cession
the right to serve process for transitory wrongs committed on the
federal lands the plaintiff could even serve the defendant on the
federal area and sue him in. a state court. The usual reservation,
however, is of the right to serve process for acts done outside the
federal area.84
v. Arlington Hotel Co., 22 F. (2d) 669 (,C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Danielson
v. Donmopray, 57 F. (2d) 565 (D. C. D. Wyo., 1932).
8See 37 YALE L. J. 796, 803 (1928). See also 45 STAT. 54 (1928) (State
law of right of action for wrongful death extended to federal areas);
and 49 STAT. 1938 (1935) (States given right to extend their industrial
insurance programs over federal areas.)
"RSTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 427, § 610.
"Livingston v. Jefferson, Fed. Case No. 8,411 (C. C. D. Va., 1811); Bar-
rett v. Palmer, 135 N. Y. 336, 31 N. E. 1017, 1018 (1892); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 613-614.
"Danielson v. Donmopray, 57 F. (2d) 565 (D. C. D. Wyo., 1932); Mad-
den v. Arnold, 47 N. Y. S. 757 (1897); Norfolk & P. B. L. R. Co. v. Parker,
152 Va. 484, 147 S. E. 461 (1929) ; 32 AERIxCAN L. R.v. 78 (1898).
"Laws, Wash. 1891, c. 18; REM. REv. STAT. § 8108.
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CLASS IV. LAND OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES AND UNDER ITS
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.
The United States can acquire exclusive jurisdiction over land
within a state in three ways. First, it may, when it reserves title
to public lands in an enabling act, expressly reserve exclusive
jurisdiction.86 Apparently this device is seldom resorted to,86 but
it seems to be a perfectly legitimate one. The Congress has the
power to admit new states into the Union,87 but there is nothing
in the Constitution which compels it to do so. The forming of states
from the territory of the United States rests in the discretion of
Congress, and hence it may leave any area under territorial status
as long as it may see fit.
Secondly, the United States may receive exclusive jurisdiction,
over land to which it holds title, by an express cession from the
state, provided that it devotes the land to a purpose within its
powers to exercise exclusive jurisdiction.38
The third, and most common, device by which the United States
may acquire exclusive jurisdiction over intrastate land is by a
purchase of such land with the consent of the legislature of the
state, as provided for in the Constitution. 9 When this method is
employed, the courts require a strict compliance with the terms of
the Constitution. The word "purchase" is not used in its common
law sense as a word of art, but means an actual purchase for a
consideration." The consent of the state must be given through the
state legislature only, and not, for example, by a convention of the
people of the state. 1 The United States must use the land "for the
erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
buildings." The phrase "other needful buildings" is, of course,
"6Benson v. U. S., 146 U. S. 525 (1892); Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v.
Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 526 (1884).
"In the act admitting Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Washington to the Union (25 STAT. 676, § 4 (1889)) the United States
reserved title to and "absolute jurisdiction and control" over Indian
lands. See, however, Draper v. U. S., 164 U. S. 240 (1896) in which it
was decided that Montana had exclusive jurisdiction over the murder of
one negro by another on an Indian reservation in Montana, notwithstand-
ing the broad provision in the enabling act. See also Deragon v. Sero,
137 Wis. 276, 118 N. W. 839, 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 842 (1908); People v.
Pierce, 41 N. Y. S. (1896); Stiff v. McLaughlin, 19 Mont. 300, 48 Pac. 232
(1897); Lebo v. Griffith, 42 S. D. 198, 173 N. W. 840 (1919) for other powers
of the states over Indian reservations.
"U. S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3.
'Cases cited in note 35. Also see the discussion of this point at page
7, supra.
"Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
'Chi., R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542 (1884); Crook
Homer & Co. v. Old Pt. Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604 (C. C. E. D. Va.,
1893). See State ex rel. Board of Com'rs v. Bruce, 77 P. (2d) 403 (Mont.,
1938).
"112 Ops. Atty. Gen. 428 (1868).
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open to a variety of constructions. For example, one may argue
that the rule of ejusdem generis applies and that hence the phrase
refers only to such unenumerated structures as are necessary
under the war power of the federal government. The courts, how-
ever, have put a broader construction upon the language so that
it covers "all structures and places necessary for carrying on the
business of the national government." 9 2 Just how far the Supreme
Court will allow this broad language to extend remains to be seen.
Suppose that the federal government purchased land for a national
recreational park, and the state consented to the purchase. Would
the United States acquire exclusive jurisdiction thereby ? It would
seem a fantastic construction to hold that the presence of a small
administration building could place several square miles of land
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States simply be-
cause the state consented to the purchase of the land. One must
remember, however, that the state could later expressly cede ex-
clusive jurisdiction over land to be so used and that it niight do so
with reservations in the case of a national park. The question of
what constitutes a needful building is becoming increasingly im-
portant as the federal government continues to expand its field of
activity, because the states will probably be reluctant to cede away
exclusive jurisdiction over areas from which large tax revenues,
from the taxation of private persons and business can be secured.
This point is illustrated by two decisions of the Supreme Court of
Washington relating to the Grand Coulee Dam Project2s
When the state consents to a purchase of land to be used for
one of the purposes set out in the Constitution 2 it may, logically,
reserve any powers compatible with the federal government's nec-
essary jurisdiction. For many years the only reservation that was
recognized as valid was that of the power to serve civil and crim-
inal process within the area for acts done outside the boundaries
thereof,0 4 and this reservation was commonly made.95 From the
1U. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518, 522 (D. C. W. D. Ky., 1903). See also,
Battle v. U. S., 209 U. S. 36 (1907); and Bannon v. Burnes, 39 Fed. 892, 899
(C. C. W. D. Mo., 1889) (post office buildings); Arlington Hotel Co. v.
Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929) (military hospital at a hot spring); 26 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 289 (1907) (reservoirs, aqueducts, and roadways appurtenant
to the water supply system of Washington, D. C.); James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 58 Sup. Ct. 208 (1937) (locks and dams); In re Kelly, 81
Fed. 545 (C. C. D. Wis., 1895); and People v. Mouse, 259 Pac. 762 (Cal.,
1927) (a soldiers' home is not a "needful building"); but see subsequent
opinion as to exclusive jurisdiction: 203 Cal. 782, 265 Pac. 944 (1928).
Contra: Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); Foley v. Shriver, 81 Va.
568 (1886).
1-4Silas Mason, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 188 Wash. 98, 61 P. (2d)
1269 (1936); and Ryan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 61 P. (2d) 1276 (1936).
"Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
"Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 (1884); Chi. R. I.
& Pac. 11. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542 (1884); Western Union Co. v.
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earliest period in our history as a nation many statesmen have
thought that the national government must have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
buildings in order to perform its functions upon such lands. 96 To
insure that the United States shall have jurisdiction Congress has
provided that no public money shall be expended upon any such
land "until the written opinion of the Attorney General shall be
had in favor of the validity of the title, nor until the consent of the
legislature of the State in which the land or site may be, to such
purchase, has been given. '97 The Attorneys General have ren-
dered several opinions on the validity of the reservations by states
of certain powers over these areas in the state acts consenting to
purchase. They have been of the opinion that the following at-
tempted reservations fail to meet the requirements of the act of
Congress: a reservation by Georgia of its civil and criminal juris-
diction over persons in territory required for the erection of a
Federal Building ;98 a reservation by Illinois of the right to admin-
ister its criminal laws upon land acquired for a Federal Building ;99
and a reservation by Kansas of "concurrent jurisdiction" over
sites acquired for federal buildings. 10 But in the latest decision
on the subject, James v. Dravo Contracting Co.100 * the United
States Supreme Court expressly decided that in consenting to the
federal government's purchase of land for "needful buildings"
the state may reserve to itself such concurrent jurisdiction over
the lands purchased as is not inconsistent with the jurisdiction
ceded to the United States by virtue of such acquisition. The court
said that it was unable to reconcile the implication that the state
could reserve no jurisdiction with the freedom of the state and its
admitted authority to refuse or qualify cessions of jurisdiction
when purchases were made without its consent. The four justices
who dissented upon another ground expressed no opinion upon this
Chiles, 214 U. S. 274 (1908); Murray v. Gerrick Co., 291 U. S. 315 (1933);
U. S. v. Cornell, Fed. Case No. 14,867 (C. C. D. R. I., 1819); Concessions
Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919); Winston Bros. Co. v.
State Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 505, 62 P. (2d) 7 (1936); Ryan v. State, 188
Wash. 115, 61 P. (2d) 1276 (1936).
" WASH. CONsST., Art. XXV. reserves the right to serve civil process for
acts done inside the reservations as well as outside.
'THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Madison). An adverse criticism of this view
is expressed by G. N. Lieber, Cessions of Jurisdiction by States to the
United States, 32 A i. L. Ri~v. 78 (1898).
"REV. STAT. § 355; 33 U. S. C. A. § 733; 34 U. S. C. A. § 520; 40 U. S.
C. A. § 255; 50 U. S. C. A. § 175.
Os31 Ops. Atty. Gen. 282 (1918).
"31 Ops. Atty. Gen. 265 (1918) ; See also 31 Ops. Atty. Gen. 263 (1918),
and 31 Ops. Atty. Gen. 294 (1918).
1"'31 Ops. Atty. Gen. 260 (1918).
"'-302 U. S. 134 (1937).
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point. °00b The power of the state to reserve jurisdiction in a consent
to purchase statute is thus considerably broadened. There may,
however, still be improper reservations, and their exact effect has
never been authoritatively decided.' 10 It may be contended that an
improper reservation in an act of consent renders the whole act
nugatory because the consent of the state must be given freely.10 2
But, upon the hypothesis that consent once given is conclusive, any
attempt by the state to reserve powers incompatible with the neces-
sary jurisdiction of the national government is void. 10 3
It is settled law that, when the United States has exclusive juris-
diction over land within the exterior boundaries of a state, that
land is not a part of the state at all. 04 The state has no power to
tax persons residing on the land ;105 nor any power to tax property
situated on the land ;o10 nor any power to tax income earned, by a
non-resident of the state, upon that land ;107 nor any power, under
a sales tax on sales made within the state to tax sales made upon
the land. 08 The criminal laws of the state do not extend to offenses
committed upon federal land, except where the assimilative crimes
acts so extend them, and even then they are not extended through
"ObSee note 26, supra.
'
0
''Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 657 (1929).
'1-People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233 (N. Y., 1819).
"'0U. S. v. Cornell, Fed. Case No. 14,867 (C. C. D. R. I., 1819); 10 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 34, 39 (1861).
"'Battle v. U. S., 209 U. S. 36 (1907) (criminal law); Western Union
Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274 (1908) (penal statute for failure to deliver
a telegram); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647 (1929) (taxation
of private property); Standard Oil Co. v. Cal., 291 U. S. 242 (1933)(sales tax); U. S. v. Cornell, Fed. Case No. 14,867 (C. C. D. R. I., 1819)
(criminal law); In re Kelly, 27 Fed. 616 (C. C. D. Me., 1885) (criminal
law); U. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518 (C. C. W. D. Ky., 1903)" (criminal
law); Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011 (D. C. W. D., Wash., 1916)
(negligent injury); U. S. v. Watkins, 22 F. (2d) 437 (D. C. N. D. Cal.,
1927) (criminal law); U. S. v. Cordy, 58 F. (2d) 1013 (D. C. D. Md.,
1932) (gasoline tax); Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac.
655 (1919) (taxation of private property); Winston Bros. Co. v. State
Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 505, 62 P. (2d) 7 (1936) (tax on doing business
within the state); Atkinson v. State Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 461, 62 P. (2d)
13 (1936) (tax on doing business within the state); Sinks v. Reese, 19
Ohio St. 306 (1869) (right to vote); Foley v. Shriver, 81 Va. 568 (1886)
(right to vote); In re Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. 580 (Mass., 1841)
(people living on a federal area are not residents of Mass.); Mitchell v.
Tibbetts, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 298 (1835). It appears, however, that a
federal area is not "foreign" in the sense that shipments into it are in
interstate commerce. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., v. Collins, 18 Cal. App.
(2d) 648, 64 P. (2d) 469 (1937).
"'Pundt v. Pendleton, 167 Fed. 997 (D. C. N. D. Ga., 1909); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. 580 (Mass., 1841); 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 577
(1854).
"'Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook 281 U. S. 647 (1929); Concessions Co.
v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919).
"''Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 505, 62 P. (2d) 7
(1936); Atkinson v. State Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 461, 62 P. (2d) 13 (1936).
The tax in these two cases was an excise tax on the privilege of doing
business in Oregon, trut it was measured by income.
"'Cases cited in note 65, supra.
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any power of the state. 109 The state has no power to extend its
civil law over a federal area,10 and state laws passed after the fed-
eral government secured exclusive jurisdiction will not apply unless
Congress re-enacts them to apply within the area."'
The civil law of the state in force when the United States ac-
quired exclusive jurisdiction is still the law within the tract where
it is consistent with the federal law and where it has not been
changed or abrogated by Congress." 2 Congress also has the power
to adopt for places under its exclusive authority such provisions
of a state's private law as presently exist."13
The people who reside upon land under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States are not residents of the state for any pur-
pose." 4 If the right to vote in state elections depends upon resi-
dence in the state, these people cannot vote ;1' they cannot send
their children to state supported schools unless the state permits
it;" 6 they are not "inhabitants" of a town and, hence, are not
entitled to poor relief ;"' they cannot take advantage of the state's
machinery for the securing of legal rights in cases such as di-
vorce,118 guardianship, adoption, and lunacy, in which the state's
jurisdiction depends upon their residence. When a resident of
such land dies thereon, and his estate consists wholly of personalty
"'Battle v. U. S., 209 U. S. 36 (1907); U. S. v. Cornell, Fed. Case No.
14,867 (C. C. D. R. I., 1819); U. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518 (C. C. W. D.
Ky. 1903); In re Kelly, 27 Fed. 616 (C. C. D. Me., 1885); U. S. v. Watkins,
22 F. (2d) 437 (D. C. N. D. Cal., 1927); Commonwealth v. Olary, 8 Mass.
72 (1811).
"'°Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); Williams v.
Arlington Hotel Co., 22 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
"'See 49 STAT. 1938 (40 U. S. C. A. § 290) and Laws, Wash. 1937, c.
147. The Workmen's Compensation Law of Washington is now in force
in federal areas in Washington, except that federal employees are not
covered. Cf., State v. Rainier Nat]. Park Co., 192 Wash. 592, 74 P. (2d)
464 (1937).
'Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 (1884); Chi., R. I.
& Pac. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542 (1884); Arlington Hotel Co. v.
Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); Murray v. Gerrick Co., 291 U. S. 315 (1933);
In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C. C. D. Neb., 1896); Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed.
1011 (D. C. W. D. Wash., 1916); Williams v. Arlington Hotel Co., 22 F.
(2d) 669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Danielson v. Donmopray, 57 F. (2d)
565 (D. C. D. Wyo., 1932).
"'See Murray v. Gerrick Co., 291 U. S. 315 (1933). In 1928 Congress
adopted, for areas under its exclusive jurisdiction, the law of right of
action for wrongful death then current in the state within whose borders
the federal area was situated. 45 STAT. 54 (1928).
"'STORY, THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed., 1891) § 1227.
1'°Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); In re Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 1 Metc. 580 (Mass., 1841).
1In re Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. 580 (Mass., 1841); see Laws.
Wash. (Extraordinary Session) 1925, c. 93, by rwhich Washington admitted
to state public schools, without payment of tuition, children residing in
United States military, naval, or lighthouse reservations or national
parks.
"'In re Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. 580 (Mass., 1841).
"'Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 Atl. 729 (1926); 36 YALE L. J. 146;
40 HARv. L. REV. 130; 11 MINN. L. REV. 74.
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located on the reservation, the problem of probating the estate
arises. The federal courts have no probate jurisdiction ;"19 hence,
if any probate is to be had, the state courts must provide the
machinery. But the state courts have no jurisdiction over a wholly
extra-state estate of a non-resident, and a court is under a duty
to refuse, upon its own motion if need be, to adjudicate a matter
over which it has no jurisdiction. There seems to be no way out
of this cul-de-sac at present, except for the state courts to ignore
their lack of jurisdiction and proceed with the probate of such
estates as a matter of expediency. 20
It is thus apparent that the inhabitants of land under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the national government are sometimes
placed in embarrassing positions. On the other hand, they are
exempt from state taxation and from certain other burdens which
residence in a state entails ;121 so perhaps they do not feel that their
lot is such a hard one.122
PART II
FEDERAL LANDS WrmHIN THE STATE or WASH=nGTON
When the State of Washington was admitted to the Union in
1889 the United States was the owner of vast tracts of public land
within the borders of the new state. In the Enabling Act12  Con-
gress provided that the constitutional convention should provide,
"by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the United
States, and the people of said state," that the people inhabiting the
state agreed to disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated
public lands lying within its boundaries, and to all Indian lands
lying within those limits, 24 and that no taxes should be imposed
"'ISXKWS, FEDERAL PRACTICE (Schweppe's Ed., 1934) § 516.
"'2See In re Grant's Estate, 144 N. Y. S. 567 (1913).
"'Cases cited in note 104, supra. And see Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283
U. S. 57 (1930). (Plaintiff resided in Fort Snelling, an area under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Hence he was neither a
resident of Minnesota nor a resident of any other state and was compelled
to pay a privilege tax for operating his car on Minnesota roads, under
circumstances under which neither a resident of Minnesota nor of any
other state would have had to pay the tax.)
"'2This statement is unsupported by authority. T~he curious may inter-
view the unfortunate Lowe and Dicks families which the callous States
of Maryland and Georgia left in "holy deadlock" because, as the parties
lived in forts, Maryland and Georgia had no jurisdiction to divorce
them. Notes 117 and 51, supra.
2225 STAT. 676, § 4 (1889).
"'The Act also provided that Indian lands should remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of Congress. Note 85, supra. Inasmuch
as the exercise of jurisdiction over Indian reservations depends not only
on the character of the land, but also on the race of the individuals to
be affected 'by the regulation in question, I shall make no effort to cover
the status of Indian lands. See Brown, The Indian Problem and the
Law, 39 YALE L. J. 307 (1930); Brown, The Taxation of Indian Property,
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by the state on lands or property belonging to or which might
thereafter be purchased by the United States or reserved for its
use. Article XXVI of the Constitution of the State of Washington
embodies the compact between the United States and the people of
Washington as required by the Enabling Act. Accordingly, the
United States was left as proprietor over all the unappropriated
public lands within the state. The great bulk of these vast tracts
has since been formed into Forest Reserves and National Forests
by Acts of Congress and by Executive Proclamations. 125 The cre-
ation of a National Forest or a Forest Reserve upon land already
owned by the United States or acquired by it through an exchange
of similar lands 16 has very little effect on the problem of jurisdic-
tion. The regulations incident to the cutting of timber, the preser-
vation of game and fish,12 the prevention of fires, and the preserva-
tion of the navigability of streams are all such as the United States
has power to make under its rights as proprietor. National Forest
land is reserved from entry by settlers, and the proprietary regula-
tions are more numerous than they are over unappropriated public
lands; but the land is still a part of the state, its residents are
still citizens of the state, and the state law is in force over the
area except where it conflicts with the rules and regulations of the
United States. 2 '
There are two National Monuments in the state of Washington.
The Mft. Olympus National Monument was established within the
15 MINN. L. REV. 182 (1930); Houghton, The Legal Statu1s of Indian
Suffrage in the United States, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 507 (1931). And see
Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186 (1937) ("But with
respect to such lands [Colville Indian Reservation] exclusive legislative
authority would be obtained by the United States only through cession
by the State.")
1Z27 STAT. 1063 (1893) (Pacific Forest Reserve); 29 STAT. 896 (1897)(Mt. Rainier Forest Reserve); 29 STAT. 901 (Olympic Forest Reserve);
29 STAT. 903 (Priest River Forest Reserve in Washington and Idaho);
29 STAT. 904 (Washington Forest Reserve); 34 STAT. 3288 (1906) (Col-
ville Forest Reserve); 34 STAT. 3010 (Wenaha Forest Reserve in Wash-
ington and Oregon); 36 STAT. 202 (1910) (Kaniksu National Forest in
Washington and Idaho); 36 STAT. 227 and 272 (Chelan National Forest);
36 STAT. 220 and 227 (Wenatchee National Forest). In 1910 Conzress
passed an act providing that, "Hereafter no forest reserve shall be
created, nor shall any additions be made to one heretofore created in
the State of Washington, except by an Act of Congress." 36 STAT. 848(1910).
141 STAT. 1366 (1921) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to ex-
change certain land in Rainier National Forest for other lands suitable
for a National Forest.
"'48 STAT. 400 (1934) authorizes the President to establish fish and
game sanctuaries in the National Forests. The jurisdiction of the states
is not to be altered without their legislative consent.
"'See the Conservation Act, 36 STAT. 961 (1911), 43 STAT. 1215 (1924),
16 U. S. C. A. § 480. See also Nickell v. Dept. of Labor and Industries,
164 Wash. 589, 3 P. (2d) 1005 (1931). (State Workmen's Compensation
statute held to cover one employed by a contractor engaged in construct-
ing a bridge for the federal government within Rainier National Forest.)
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Olympic National Forest by President Theodore Roosevelt to pre-
serve and protect "certain objects of unusual scientific interest,
including several glaciers, and the region which from time im-
memorial has formed the summer range and breeding grounds of
the Olympic Elk (cervus roosevelti), a species peculiar to these
mountains and rapidly decreasing in numbers.' 1 29 The Whitman
National Monument was established in 1935 in memory of Marcus
Whitman and his wife.' These two areas are similar to national
forests except that any use of the land which interferes with its
preservation and protection as a National Monument is forbidden.
These National Forests and National Monuments fall within the
second class of intrastate lands owned by the United States; they
are devoted to a public purpose,' but there has been no cession
whatsoever of state jurisdiction.
In 1899 Congress set aside part of the Mt. Rainier Forest Re-
serve as Rainier National Park and placed it under the control
of the Secretary of the Interior. 32 In 1901 the legislature of the
State of Washington ceded to the United States "exclusive juris-
diction" over "all the territory that is now or may hereafter be
included in that tract of land in the State of Washington set aside
for the purposes of a national park and known as the Rainier
National Park; saving, however, to the said state, the right to
serve civil and criminal process within the limits of the aforesaid
park, in suits or prosecutions for or on account of rights acquired,
obligations incurred, or crimes committed in said state, but outside
of said park; and saving further to the said state the right to tax
persons and corporations, their franchises and property on the
lands included in said park.' 13 3 In 1916 Congress accepted this
cession and recognized the rights that the state had reserved to
itself.' Accordingly, Rainier National Park is no longer a part
of the state of WasHington and is an area falling witLhin the third
class of lands owned by the United States. The Attorneys General
of the State of Washington have recognized this fact in several
opinions holding that the state's jurisdiction and state laws do not
extend over the area in the park. 35 The Attorneys General have
1"35 STAT. 2247 (1909).
1349 STAT. 2028 (1935).
"'National Forests are established to improve forests, to secure favor-
able water flow and to furnish a continuous timber supply to the people
of the nation. 16 U. S. C. A. § 425.
1230 STAT. 993 (1899).
='Laws, Wash. 1901, p. 192; REm. REV. STAT. § 8110.
"'39 STAT. 243 (1916); 16 U. S. C. A. § 95.
"S0ps. Atty. Gen. 1921, p. 7. (Workmen's Compensation. But see note
110, supra); Ops. Atty. Gen. 1927, p. 202 (Insurance Code); Ops. Atty.
Gen. 1927, p. 226 (traffic moving into the park is in interstate commerce
so far as the automobile transportation laws of the state are concerned.)
See also State v. Rainier Natl. Park Co., 192 Wash. 592, 74 P. (2d) 464
(1937).
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construed the state's reservation of the power to tax to mean that it
can tax not only private property and persons in the park, but
also that the state automobile license tax and the state taxes on
gasoline sales should be collected within the boundaries of the
park.186 The state gasoline tax, however, is levied on gasoline sold
"within the state","'1 and the ruling as to this tax may be ques-
tioned. Although the state may have the power to levy a tax on
private sales made within the park; yet, a statute which covers
only sales made within the state does not in terms cover sales made
within the park, because that area is no longer a part of the state.138
Perhaps, however, this literal construction was not intended by the
legislature.
Article XXV of the Constitution of the State of Washington
gives the consent of the state "to the exercise by the Congress of
the United States of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever
over such tract or parcels of land as are now held and reserved by
the United States for the purpose of erecting thereon forts, maga-
zines, arsenals, dock-yards, lighthouses, and other needful buildings
in accordance with the provisions of the seventeenth paragraph of
the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the
United States": "And provided that all civil process issued from
the courts of this state, and such criminal process as may issue
under the authority of this state, against any person charged with
crime in cases arising outside of such reservations, may be served
and executed thereon in the same mode and manner and by the
same officers as if the consent herein given had not been made."
This article is difficult to interpret; it purports to be a consent of
the state as indicated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the
United States Constitution, but it is not a consent to purchase,
because purchase is not mentioned in it, s  and it is not a consent
by the legislature of the state. 140 However, it has the appearance
M.Ops. Atty. Gen. 1923, p. 87 (distributors selling liquid fuel within
park must pay the state tax); Ops. Atty. Gen. 1931, p. 5 (a person is
not entitled to a refund of a gasoline tax on gasoline used in trucks
operated entirely within boundaries of the park); Ops. Atty. Gen. 1933,
pp. 48, 49 ("Transportation between points within the park and points
outside of the park but within the state may be interstate for some pur-
poses, but is intrastate insofar as the taxing power of the state is con-
cerned.")
'
3
'See Laws, Wash. 1921, p. 670, and REM. REv. STAT. § 8328.
,"But in a recent case a lower federal court held that the Rainier
National Park Co. must pay sales, occupation, and highway transportation
taxes because the phrase "within the state" means "within the geograph-
ical boundaries of the state". Rainier Nat. Park Co. v. Martin,. 18 F.
Supp. 481 (D. C. W. D. Wash., 1937). For the same result on a different
ground see the same case in 23 F. Supp. 60, affirmed 302 U. S. 661 (1937).
"'3See note 89, stpra.
"'The consent, to be valid under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution,
must be made by the state legislature and not by a convention of the
people thereof. 12 Ops. Atty. Gen. 428 (1868).
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of a cession of exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, and the
reservation of the right to serve process should be valid so long
as it does not interfere with the power of the national government
to control the area.' Although the article is not, in terms, a ces-
sion, it is certainly one in spirit, and there should be no objections
to construing it as such. But it refers only to such lands, held
for the purposes enumerated, as the United States owned at the
time the state constitution became effective.
The most important law of this state relative to the jurisdiction
of the United States was passed by the legislature in 1891.142 The
first part of this statute is a consent by the legislature to the
acquisition by purchase or by condemnation by the United States
of any tract of land within the boundaries of the state "for the
sites of locks, dams, piers, break-waters, keepers' dwellings, and
other necessary structures and purposes required in the improve-
ment of the rivers and harbors of this state or bordering thereon,
or for the sites of forts, magazines, arsenals, docks, navy-yards,
naval stations, or other needful buildings authorized by any act of
Congress." The consent is given in accordance with Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution. The second
part of the statute cedes to the United States the jurisdiction of the
state over all such lands "as may have been or may be hereafter
acquired by purchase or condemnation, or set apart by the general
government for any or either of the purposes before mentioned."
Over all the areas thus acquired or set aside, under both parts of
the act, the state reserves to itself the right to serve civil and
criminal process "against any person charged with crimes com-
mitted, or for any cause of action or suit accruing without the
bounds of such tract."
Under this statute, as soon as the federal government purchases
or condemns a tract of land to be used for one of the purposes
enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution,
it secures exclusive jurisdiction over it. Hence the national gov-
ernment has exclusive control over all forts, magazines, arsenals,
dock-yards, armories, military stations, naval stations, torpedo
bases, military hospitals, lighthouses, Coast Guard stations, federal
office buildings, post offices, court houses, land offices, weather
bureaus, penitentiaries, and customs houses-in short, over all
structures which may come under the head of "other needful
buildings"'143-- whieh it has now established or may hereafter
""See note 45, supra.
"'2Laws, Wash. 1891, c. 18, p. 31; REar. REV. STAT. § 8108. See also Laws,
Wash. 1890, p. 459.
"'See not6 92, supra.
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establish on lands acquired by purchase or condemnation. Nor
can it be controverted that it has the same jurisdiction by cession
from the state, over such areas, as it held for any of the purposes
enumerated in the 1891 Act of the legislature of Washington at
the time that act became effective. It may be argued that, by this
act, the state did not cede "exclusive jurisdiction", and that hence,
under the rule of In re Kelly," 4 the United States received, over
such areas as are not used for "needful buildings", only such juris-
diction as is necessary to carry out the purpose for which the land
is to be used. As to this, it may be answered that the result of the
Kelly case is improper: for, if it be the law, then an act ceding
merely "jurisdiction" is simply a declaration of what has hap-
pened without the act of the legislature. Rather, it would seem
that a statute ceding "jurisdiction" and reserving only the right
to serve process shows a clear intent to cede "exclusive jurisdic-
tion".
It is manifest that the "consent to purchase" part of the 1891
statute can apply only to such areas as are to be used for "needful
buildings". Nevertheless, the consent to purchase obviously covers
all future acquisitions within its scope, because a consent may prop-
erly look to the future.
But suppose that the United States does not purchase or con-
demn a tract of land, but sets it aside from the public domain and
devotes it to one of the purposes listed in the 1891 statute. The
consent to purchase clause cannot apply. Can the cession of juris-
diction part of the act operate upon land set aside after 1891? This
is doubtful, for how can a cession be made to apply to the future?
If it is argued that a consent to purchase act is only a form of
cession and that it can apply to future acquisitions, the answer is
that the Constitution stands over the state and the United States
and provides that, when the United States purchases land to be
used for a "needful building" and the state has consented to such
purchase, the federal government then has the power to exercise
"exclusive leg-islation". A cession, however, is not provided for in
the Constitution-the automatic quality is lacking-and hence it
seems as improper to hold that a state can cede away its jurisdic-
tion over land to be set aside in the future as it would be to sustain
a deed by a private person presently granting to the grantee all
such of the grantor's land as the grantee should put to certain uses
in years to come.
The most recent cases in which the effect of this statute was con-
sidered are Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission 4I and Ryan v.
"'71 Fed. 545 (C. C. D. Wis., 1895).
"1188 Wash. 98, 61 P. (2d) 1269 (1936), and 302 U. S. 186 (1937).
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State of Washington.4 6 Plaintiffs in both cases were non-resident
contractors engaged, by contract with the United States, in per-
forming certain work upon, and wholly within, the land owned by
the United States for the Grand Coulee Dam Project within the
exterior boundaries of the state of Washington.147 The state im-
posed upon plaintiffs its occupation tax for doing business "within
the state". In suits for recovery of taxes paid and for injunc-
tions against further impositions of this tax, plaintiffs contended,
inter alia, that the area upon which they were working was under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and not a
part of the state at all. The Supreme Court of Washington, speak-
ing through Judge Steinert in the Ryan case, decided this point
adversely to plaintiffs. The court admitted that locks and dams
might be "needful buildings" and that the 1891 statute gave the
state's consent to the federal government's purchase of land for
needful buildings within the meaning of the United States Consti-
tution, but it was of opinion that the state never intended to cede
away its jurisdiction over such an area as that included in the
dam project, because it did not "clearly appear that the land is to
be used by the United States for a constitutional or governmental
purpose."
When these cases were decided by the United States Supreme
Court the decisions of the state court were affirmed. The court,
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, was somewhat doubt-
ful of the propriety of the state court's construction of the 1891
statute, but went on to observe, "Considering the scope of the
federal undertaking we cannot say that this construction of Sec-
tion 8108 (Rem. Rev. Stat.) is inadmissible." Since the decision
was based upon this construction of the statute it was not neces-
sary to decide the question of whether or not a cession, other than
by consent to purchase, can apply to the future, and this question
is still open. It should be observed that the United States Supreme
Court also decided that the federal government does not have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over river bed, shore, and upland lands ac-
quired from the state, inasmuch as in neither state nor federal
statutes is there any provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction. 4 s
The state could, of course, expressly cede jurisdiction to the
"188 Vash. 115, 61 P. (2d) 1276 (1936), and 302 U. S. 186 (1937).
"'The purposes of the Grand Coulee Dam Project are: the control
of floods, the improvement of navigation, the regulation of the flow of
streams, the storage and delivery of water, the reclamation of public
lands and Indian reservations, and the generation of electric power for
the financial aid of these purposes. 49 STAT. 1039 (1935). The land was
either set aside by the United States from the public domain or acquired
by purchase, condemnation, or donation.
"'See REM. REV. STAT. §§ 7411, 7412.
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United States over the land included in the Grand Coulee Project,
but when there is no necessity for the federal government's having
exclusive jurisdiction, and when the area is one in which so much
activity is going on and from which large tax revenues from private
persons engaged in business can be secured, it is hardly likely
that the state will do so-certainly it will be reluctant to give up
its power to tax private persons and property.
Inasmuch as the improvement and protection of rivers and har-
bors is a proper function of the national government and not an
encroachment on the rights of the state, such improvements as the
Lake Washington Ship Canal may be regarded as "needful build-
ings ". 1 49 Accordingly, such land as was purchased or condemned
by the federal government for the Lake Washington canal and
locks came immediately under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, by virtue of the Constitution and of the 1891 Act
of the Washington legislature. But such land as was set aside
by the United States or as was devoted by the state for canal pur-
poses is, presumably, not affected by the 1891 statute, because it
was not purchased, and because it was set aside or received after
1891. And the state has never made an express cession of jurisdic-
tion over those lands: the only acts of the legislature relative to
that canal have been a grant to the United States of a right of way
over state lands,'5" a grant of the right to place the canal, locks,
etc., upon the proposed site,15 ' and an act giving the City of Seattle
power to convey certain shore lands to the United States for the
canal.'52 Therefore, as to the lands included in the canal improve-
ment, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over the
lands acquired by purchase or condemnation for canal purposes,
but has only such jurisdiction as is necessary to maintain and
operate the canal over all the other land included in that project.
Part of that area, then, falls within the fourth class of federally
owned land, and part falls within the second class.
When the War Department decided to establish a military reser-
vation at what is now Fort Lewis, Washington, the state legislature
authorized Pierce County to condemn land for that purpose and
to donate it to the United States. As the national government thus
would not acquire that land by purchase or by its own condemna-
tion proceedings, the Legislative Act of 1891 would not cover the
acquisition. But the legislature rose to the occasion and expressly
ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction, reserving only
the right to serve process, with the proviso that a deed and a map
IOU. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518 (D. C. W. D. Ky., 1903).
'11Laws, Wash. 1907, c. 216, p. 498.
'
51Laws, Wash. 1901, c. 6, p. 7.
'OLaws, Wash. (Extraordinary Session) 1925, c. 116, p. 183.
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be recorded in the Pierce County Auditor's office. 5 3 This proviso
gave rise to a rather interesting case. Before the map and deed
had been recorded, one Pothier committed an alleged murder on
the land and was indicted under the Federal Penal Code, which
applies only to areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the indictment was bad, because Camp Lewis was not yet
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, and
Pothier was released.""- Observe, however, that there is a presump-
tion in such cases that the deeds, plats, or maps have been properly
recorded.1 55 The land included within the boundaries of Fort Lewis
falls within the fourth class of areas owned by the United States;
the jurisdiction of the federal government is exclusive, except for
the state's reserved right to serve process, and the land is not a
part of the state of Washington.
When the United States ceases to use land over which the state
has ceded jurisdiction, the jurisdiction previously ceded reverts to
the state.15 Suppose, however, that the United States has exclusive
jurisdiction over a tract of land, which it purchased for a "needful
building", by virtue of the state's consent to the purchase; when
it ceases to use this land for the needful building for which it was
purchased, does the jurisdiction revert to the state ? It seems that,
in policy, it should, for there is no reason for the national govern-
ment's having exclusive jurisdiction over an area no longer used
for a public purpose, although still owned by the United States.
But the jurisdiction is acquired by operation of the Constitution,
and no provision is made therein for any reverter. So far as the
writer can ascertain, this point has never been squarely decided,
and it appears to be a fairly close question. Of course the United
States can give up its jurisdiction by an express Act of Congress",
or by a sale of the land to a private person or to a corporation.
In 1922 and 1924 Congress conveyed to the State of Washington
the title to certain military reservations on Fidalgo, Hope, Whidby,
Skagit and San Juan Islands, reserving the right of user for mili-
tary, naval, or lighthouse purposes, the land so conveyed to be
,"Laws, Wash. 1917, c. 3, p. 2.
15'Pothier v. Rodman, 291 Fed. 311 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923). The proceeding
was one for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court later reversed
the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the question of whether
or not the locus of the alleged crime was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States was one to -be determined by the court where the
indictment was found. Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U. S. 399 (1923).
'ISteele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011, 1015 (D. C. W. D. Wash., 1916).
'1Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 542 (1884).
"6'See 5 STAT. 520 (1819). Secretary of War authorized to sell useless
forts, "and the jurisdiction which had been specially ceded [i. e. by con-
sent to purchase] for military purposes to the United States by a state
over such sites shall thereafter cease."
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used for public parks.158 In effect these statutes divested the
United States of its jurisdiction and restored that of the state,
since the United States must own the land in order to have juris-
diction over it.
CONCLUSION
The problem of jurisdiction over federally owned lands within
the borders of the states is peculiarly important in the state of
Washington, as the national government is the owner of a large
part of the land in this state and devotes that land to all sorts of
purposes. Although the general law relative to the situation is
fairly well settled, there are many discrepancies among the cases,
and it is hoped that the courts will, in the future, correct these
inconsistencies.
The principal burden of solving the problems created by the
existence within the borders of the states of areas under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States rests upon Congress and
upon the legislatures of the several states. The law in these areas
dealing with the ordinary civil rights, powers, and duties of private
persons should be brought up to date by Congress, either by direct
legislation or by statutes adopting for those areas the current state
law relative to civil matters. The latter device--" assimilative civil
law acts"-would afford the better solution.
The fact that the federal courts have jurisdiction over residents
of lands under the exclusive control of the national government
may well result in injustice, because the jurisdiction of those
courts is so hedged about by statutes. Suppose, for example, that
a resident of such an area commits a tort or breaches a contract
and that the only remedy of the injured person is given to him
by an Act of Congress relative to the private law in force upon
that land. So long as the wrongdoer remains upon the federal
area, the plaintiff can get relief only through the federal courts,
and, as this is a case arising "under a law of the United States",
the plaintiff must show that the "matter in controversy exceeds,
exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000.00".1 9
If he cannot show this jurisdictional amount, he will be without a
remedy. Such difficulties as this can be corrected by an amend-
ment to the Judicial Code expressly recognizing and providing
for the peculiar situations which arise because of the presence of
these "islands" of sole federal control. It is submitted, however,
that it would be better simply to give aggrieved persons the right
to sue in state courts, but it is doubtful if Congress alone can grant
this right, as such, because it would be inconsistent with the ex-
"542 STAT. 469 (1922); 42 STAT. 174 (1922); 43 STAT. 1283 (1924); 43
STAT. 1185 (1924).
'1'Judicial Code § 24; 28 U. S. C. A. § 41.
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elusive jurisdiction given the United States. It is suggested that
Congress re-cede to the states civil jurisdiction over private persons
residing on areas over which it is not necessary that the federal
government have such powers. Of course where the state cedes
jurisdiction by an express statute or by a consent to purchase act,
it can reserve the power to serve its civil process for acts done
inside or outside the federal reservation, and perhaps this proviso
should always be included in these statutes.
In short, there is no real reason in policy for denying to private
persons residing upon land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
national government the numerous benefits and privileges enjoyed
by residents of the states, nor is there any good reason for allowing
those persons to escape the burdens of modern civil life. It is
within the power of Congress and the state legislatures to remedy
the defects and uncertainties of the system as it now exists, and
it is hoped that future legislation will solve the present difficulties
and prevent, as nearly as possible, the occurrence of new ones in
years to come.
